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Abstract
Decision support often focuses on substantive rationality (what to choose). The procedural rationality (how to choose) of the
process of long-term strategic decision making is then often neglected. In strategic decision making, supporting the decision
process is more important than supporting the search for an ‘‘optimal’’solution to the problem, especially since for most policy
problems a well-deﬁned objective function does not exist. Such a problem occurs in setting the energy policy for the Indonesian
island of Java. Indonesia wants to introduce natural gas into the fuel mix. Ways to support this decision making process with the
existing level of ITwere analyzed. Because the government of a developing country has very small funds to invest, a specialized
group decision support system (GDSS) was designed to allow for long-term support. Its restrictions are discussed here.
# 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Coordinating decision making in policy planning
is a major problem for every government. Because of
the potentially large efﬁciency gains, this holds espe-
cially for developing countries. Issue areas range from
industrial development, energy supply and demand, to
education and defense [16]. Some are strongly related,
for example, industrialization and energy supply,
whereas others are not. Policy planning can be looked
upon as a (never ending) sequence of related strategic
decisions. A choice limits the range of future options
but solves a particular current problem.
The sparse amount of literature on decision support
for public administration focuses mainly on the link
between the activity level and the related IT-solution.
Strategic decision making as a time consuming pro-
cess with feedback is neglected; in their evaluation of
groupdecisionsupportsystem(GDSS)research,Chun
and Park [4] do not feel that the time frame of the
decision is an important factor, nor do they consider
the problem of coordinating a decision process over
longer periods. Policy planning and policy evaluation
requirelotsoftime,unlessthereisanimmediatecrisis.
However, here we focus on opportunity problems.
The literature emphasizes the need to invest in a
comprehensive and advanced IT-infrastructure to gain
advantage. Saxena and Aly even point at the necessity
of these investments by rapidly growing developing
countries in order to maintain their high economic
growth. Bouras et al. [3] show how the Internet a
nd Intranet can be used to design policy support.
Developing countries, however, lack the ﬁnancial
resources, and therefore, this calls for efﬁcient and
cost-effective decision making. Furthermore, a low
level of telephone and computer infrastructure, and
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PII: S0378-7206(02)00044-7computer literacy [2] characterizes public administra-
tion in a developing country. Therefore, when design-
ing a decision support the available level of IT should,
as much as possible, be considered a constraint,
in order to minimize the cost of IT investment and,
more importantly, the necessity for a comprehensive
learning process.
Many frameworks have been formulated to identify
differentformsof(group)decisionsupport(see[13,14]).
However, these frameworks focus more on the hard-
ware and software, than on the kind of decisions to be
taken and their time frame. Views are often limited to
decision rooms and computer conference facilities.
Policy formulation is characterized by the need for
coordinationofgroups withdifferentandpossiblycon-
ﬂicting goals over a long period of time. Governments
(as businesses) prefer a policy that leaves as many
options as possible open for the future [19].
The process of strategic decision making plays only
a minor role in research on decision support [6,7].
Eom identiﬁes manyarticles and books focusing onIT
aspects of (G)DSS, but only a few articles and books
that are related to organizational and time aspects of
decision making. Only Mintzberg et al. [12] explicitly
deal with strategic decision making as a process. So
supporting it is not high on the research agenda,
despite the fact that it has many fascinating aspects
and that improvement has a large impact.
What is there to support? Policy planning or public
collective decision making for a particular issue area
is characterized by related strategic decisions that
must be made simultaneously over time. This process
has, however, its own logic due to the many stake-
holders, each with its own goals. Simon [17] distin-
guishes two types of rationality in decision making:
substantive rationality (what to choose) and proce-
dural rationality (how to choose). From the applica-
tion point of view, support of policy planning is in
the area of procedural rationality rather than substan-
tive rationality. This support, which leads to better
decisions, is sometimes termed prescriptive modeling
[1].
Furthermore, any policy planning will, at best, lead
to a satisﬁcing solution [9], which is a solution path
acceptable (not optimal) for almost all parties con-
cerned. Minzberg et al.’s description of the strategic
decision process can be used to guide the formulation
of an adequate GDSS concept for long-term policy
planning. However, the use of a GDSS for policy
planning requires (irregular) decision meetings to
agree upon important assumptions or solutions for
sub-problems, so an adequate organizational context
is needed.
To distinguish the GDSS from other forms of group
support,other concepts and techniques have been deﬁ-
ned and introduced, e.g. computer supported coopera-
tive work (CSCW) and cooperative decision support
systems (CDSSs) [5,10]. Here the term GDSS is used,
but due to the nature of the problem, the term CSCW
or CDSS would (partly) cover the approach also,
because the decision process is supported separately
and asynchronously.
A prototype GDSS called GASOP is presented here
to illustrate our view of supporting long-term policy
planning. It was developed to support the formulation
of Indonesia’s domestic energy policy for the island
of Java (inhabited by more than 120 million people
and the location of over 80% of Indonesia’s non-oil
economy). For several years, GASOP has been used
to analyze Java’s energy policy [18], but always
by a team of consultants in cooperation with their
Indonesian counterparts in different ministries. The
combined use by several ministries after the consul-
tants left has never been realized, due to an inadequate
transfer of knowledge and lack of adequate organiza-
tional support. Hopefully, others can learn from this
experience.
2. Rationality in decision making
In the normative view, it is assumed that decision
problems can be generalized and solved in an objec-
tive and rational manner. A problem can be translated
into a mathematical model, future preferences are
exogenous, stable and known with adequate preci-
sion, and an objective function can be formulated.
Under these conditions an optimal solution can be
derived.
These conditions are, however, not met in public
collective decision making. March argues, that public
decision making is characterized by conﬂicting objec-
tives representing the values of different participants
with no ‘optimal’ solution (see also [15]). A similar
view on strategic planning for business organizations
wasdevelopedbyMintzberg[11].Inhisview,strategic
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lized procedure to produce an articulated result in the
form of an integrated system of decisions. The role of
a DSS or GDSS is to help in formalizing and improv-
ing parts of this procedure through the use of IT.
In policy planning, the main problem is in coping
simultaneously with the complexity of the problem
and of the decision process. Combining adequate
lessons from substantive rationality on the one hand
and with human and organizational performance
rationality on the other has resulted in prescriptive
models that are concerned with how organizations
(and humans) can make good decisions, and how to
train them to make better decisions.
The importance of procedural rationality increases
(and that of substantive rationality decreases) with the
complexity of the planning problem and it is for
procedural rationality that prescriptive support is
needed most. In this view, decision support is much
more than logically consistent models with single
solutions as suggested by [8].
2.1. Energy planning in Mintzberg’s framework
During the identiﬁcation phase, recognition is the
process inwhichdecisionmakersbecomeawareofthe
fact that there is a problem. Diagnosis is required to
order and combine the information that made the
decision makers aware that there is a problem. During
the identiﬁcation phase, the Indonesian Government
recognized that Indonesia’s gas reserves ought to be
utilized more efﬁciently for the domestic market.
Stimuli for this policy issue go back more than ten
years and came from many sources. Aiding agencies,
such as the World Bank and the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), wanted to see an economically efﬁcient
use of Indonesia’s indigenous resources. Indonesia’s
state-owned gas distribution company PGN wanted to
increase its distribution activities to supply the rapidly
growing economy. Moreover, other public and private
companies urged the Indonesian Government to sup-
ply them with natural gas. Finally, oil companies had
discovered a number of on- and off-shore gas reserves
in the vicinity of west Java and south Sumatra that
were not exploited.
Through a number of studies by consultants, these
stimuli induced what, in Mintzberg et al.’s framework,
is called recognition and diagnosis of the problem.
These lead to the development phase that results
in one or more solutions to the problem. However,
because there are no readymade ones, the design of a
long-term energy policy (including investing in a gas
infrastructure) is required. This is a complex and
iterative process, which would normally result in
one or two solutions for the short run (up to 5 years),
and a limited number of options for the long-term (25
years). Design offers several possibilities for support
and is more than the technical design of a gas trans-
mission system. It involves modeling the potential
markets, developing a consistent energy pricing pol-
icy, reviewing the gas reserves and related supply
possibilities, identifying branch line investment pro-
jects, and designing regional gas distribution infra-
structures. The technical design requires a team of
specialized engineers that develop a number of pos-
sible solutions, guided by the designed demand fore-
casts,pricingpolicies,etc.Thisprocessisiterative,the
feasibility of meeting demand in different geographi-
cal areas and/or economic sectors depends on the cost
of the infrastructure. (Note that design may require
reentering the identiﬁcation phase, because new or
insufﬁcient information is available.)
All major design activities (market analyzes, pricing
policies, etc.) can be supported. The overall policy
design can be factored into a set of related design sub-
problems that must ﬁrst be solved. The solutions to
sub-problems are then combined to search for a clearer
view of the total problem and failure at any point leads
to iteration.
The next phase is the selection phase, in which all
information is coupled and evaluated and in which,
through bargaining between the parties, solutions for
different sub-problems emerge. If a solution for a sub-
problem is authorized, it becomes a ﬁxed input for the
remaining problem.
As the technical design (or designs) become more
and more mature, the analysis focuses on the ﬁnancial
and economic net present values of the investments,
the amount of foreign exchange required, the debt–
service ratio, investment schedules, the selection of
admissible demand categories, and the corresponding
energy pricing policy.
Such a process lead to a limited set of ways to
introduce natural gas in Java’s fuel mix. These were
then proposed to the Indonesian Cabinet, which chose
one. The solutions also indicated what other decisions
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energy pricing policy (which started the social unrest
in 1997).
3. Energy policy decision process
Policy planning in the ﬁeld of energy is a sequence
of (almost) irreversible decisions, especially when any
one leads to a substantial investment. In this section,
we brieﬂy describe the problem at hand, which is a
typical example of public policy planning, the pro-
blem environment and its dynamics.
3.1. The decision problem
TheimmediatereasontoadjustIndonesia’sdomestic
energypolicywasthefactthatnaturalgaswasavailable
domestically, but most industries used imported oil
products. These oil products were heavily subsidized,
costing the Indonesian Government billions of US
dollars annually. For this reason, the Indonesian
Government wanted to replace the imported oil pro-
ducts by domestic natural gas.
For historical reasons, gas was only used in some
low value added energy intensive industrial processes,
namely, feedstock to produce nitrogen fertilizer and
steel and in some power plants. These applications
were, however, only proﬁtable if gas was cheap.
Because of the spatial distribution of the gas
reserves, the development of a substantial market
for gas was required before it would be proﬁtable
to connect Java to reserves further away. For this, the
limited gas reserves in the vicinity of Java could be
used. Therefore, the Indonesian Government wanted
to know in which markets/applications the gas was
most beneﬁcial to the economy.
3.2. Policy coordination structure
The Ministry of Mines and Energy (MoE) coordi-
nates Indonesia’s energy policy. Its goal is to support a
technically, ﬁnancially, and economically efﬁcient
energy mix for all sectors of Java’s economy (house-
holds, industries, power).




that the total economy would beneﬁt through exports
and import substitution.
The state-owned electricity company PLN, pro-
motes natural gas for the production of electricity
for intermediate and peak loads. PGN wanted the
gas for its industrial customers who currently use
oil products, and because natural resources belong
to the government, the Indonesian state-owned oil and
gas company PERTAMINAwas a major cash cow for
the Indonesian Government.
It was not clear what usage of gas would be most
beneﬁcial to the economy. Selling gas at higher prices
to high value applications leads to higher income from
domestic sales and a more competitive domestic
industry, whereas selling gas at a low price to energy
intensive industries induces indirect income through
exports and import substitution.
Every one of the goals can be achieved through
Indonesia’s energy policy, but not all at the same time.
Every related problem (how to achieve the goal) has a
‘champion’ or ‘most interested party’. Other partici-
pants may, however, have a special interest in the
achievement of a champion’s solution. A case to point
is the interest that the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)
has in the production of a speciﬁc gas based chemical,
viz. nitrogen fertilizer. The MoA considers a sufﬁcient
supply of fertilizer a cornerstone for a successful food
policy. Thus, it has a common interest with the Basic
Chemicals Department within the MoI.
One thing is clear, achieving all goals at the same
time is not possible, and there is no method or meth-
odologythatallowsustoﬁnd‘thesolution’.Supporting
and coordinating the policy development process is the
best that can be achieved. Here, the use of GDSS can
make a difference.
3.3. The problem environment
Changing Java’s fuel mix is related to a number of
other policy issues, such as, energy pricing, economic
development and its geographical distribution, indus-
trialpolicy,environmentalpolicy,andexploitationand
exploration of new reserves. These policies need to be
coordinated with the energy policy, but every one of
them is characterized by its own problems, e.g. due to
subsidized prices of oil products that do not reﬂect the
real cost of energy to the economy, energy is used
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polluted. However, quick adjustment of the energy
pricing policy meets with strong opposition by resi-
dential and industrial consumers, and for steel making
and the production of nitrogen fertilizer the subsidies
are protection from international competition.
Public administration in a developing country is
also ‘highly bureaucratized and extremely centra-
lized’. This makes the formulation of a policy for a
complex problem even more difﬁcult. At every level
there are inter- and intra-group negotiations. Also,
alliances will be formed to achieve particular goals.
There are groups with a less prominent interest in
the problem also. The Ministry of Planning (MoP),
responsible for the long-term economic plans and
growth scenarios, and the Ministry of Finance
(MoF) that analyze the effects of the proposed solu-
tions on the budget and on the country’s debt–service
ratio will reject them if they are deemed insufﬁcient.
In a volatile economy, a policy decision often lags
behind. By speeding up the support processes, the
introduction of IT in the form of multilevel group
support can improve decision making.
Most literature on GDSS has as a premise that
decision makers want to formulate goals they all can
support, and that they can use IT to ﬁnd a solution that
meets these goals. Our characterization of the problem
of policy planning shows that this view does not ﬁt.
Groupshave conﬂictinggoalsandwillnotchangetheir
view in such a way that their goals will be in line with
thegoalsofothergroups.Dependingontheimportance
ofa particulargoal,a groupwill,however,concede ata
certain point in time and at an appropriate, but not
complete, level of goal fulﬁllment.
3.4. Decision dynamics
Energy policy planning is a dynamic process with
interrupts, feedback loops, delays, and speedups.
There are two basic dynamic aspects: changes in
the group of those who have a key interest in the
policy(Mintzberg’s political activities), and maintain-
ing consistency over time between successive deci-
sions (decision control and decision communication).
Changes in the composition of the group can result
fromworkalreadydoneordecisionsalreadytaken.For
example, after the Indonesian Government decided to
supply gas to reﬁneries in west Java, the reﬁneries and
the related department in the MoE lost interest in the
problem and were no longer active in policy planning.
Maintaining consistency in assumptions and inter-
mediate results is required to avoid mistakes. For
example, the planning of industrial estates and the
planning of gas and electricity transmission must be
coordinated. This is not always the case, resulting in
mis-investments and the loss of potential foreign
investments. Good organization and IT-support can
help to avoid this.
4. GASOP: a multilevel GDSS for policy planning
Thus, every group involved in policy planning has a
special interest in and speciﬁc knowledge of part(s) of
the policy issue, or has an interest in other policy
decisions that are affected by the policy to be formu-
lated.Thissupportsthestatementthatthereisnosingle
optimal solution for all related problems. What is
needed is a GDSS that allows every sub-group to
analyze its own sub-problem and to formulate policy
proposals, taking into account the policy proposals
of other groups with respect to related sub-problems.
All policies need then to be coordinated to formulate
a comprehensive and consistent planning for the
total problem. Therefore, the system has to fulﬁl the
following criteria:
(i) every sub-problem of the planning should be
supported by a (G)DSS for the sub-problem’s
‘champion’;
(ii) to support their own decision process, other
groups must have access to the solutions or
planning proposals formulated by other groups;
(iii) because some sub-problems are more closely
linked than others, several levels of coordination




latter problem is chosen, it needs no more specially
organized coordination between potential gas users.
4.1. The GDSS GASOP
To support the formulation of a long-term energy
policy for Java a computerized GDSS, called GASOP,
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tems that are either a DSS or a GDSS to support the
discussion on particular sub-problem by speciﬁc
groups. For example, IRON and STEEL supports
decision making on energy supply for iron and steel
production in the MoI and POWER determines the
optimal long-term fuel mix for power generation.
Furthermore, every (G)DSS allows for comprehensive
what-if analysis.
Every (G)DSS-module contains:
(i) A user interface to communicate input data, to
set decision variables, and to introduce policy
options.
(ii) A system of one or more (simulation) models
describing the actual situation for a policy area
and all relevant information. The system is used
to evaluate the effect of the choices made under
(i) and has links to those parts of GASOP that
contain relevant information.
(iii) An output system that allows the users to look at
results in detail or in graphical form, and with
some basic management report facilities.
The user interfaces in GASOP are equipped with
some intelligence. First of all, the system checks
whether an option introduced, or a choice made by
the user is admissible. If not, the inconsistency is
communicated to the user. Furthermore, if a combina-
tion of input data and/or other options is unlikely from
a technical, ﬁnancial or economic point of view, the
user interface will point this out and ask the user if
this is what he/she really wants. If so the choice is
accepted, but with a warning.
To ensure that the same assumptions on economic
and geographical growth scenarios and energy prices
are used, there are two modules that contain agreed
upon options and current policies (GENGDP and
PRICES). This is the ﬁrst sub-problem (indicated as
Level 1). It results in a number of possible energy
pricing policies (including no change), and an agreed
upon set of scenarios for future economic develop-
ment (geographically and in time). This information
can also be used by groups looking at other problems,
such as the planning of electricity transmission and of
highways. In this way, the assumptions in the pre-
paration of different policy issues can be coordinated
and made consistent.
The GDSSs on the second level can be used to
analyze the various sub-problems. In some cases, for
example, the DSS for the power sector (POWER)
optimization methods (linear programming) are used
as well as simulation to derive a solution for the sub-
problem: the least cost fuel mix for the power sector.
Thedetailedresultsofshortandmediumtermplanning
Fig. 1. Outline of GASOP.
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and a consistency check can be performed.
In every block, the main responsibility for a module
is indicated along with the other most interested
parties. When a solution for a particular sub-problem
is decided, this solution is communicated to the level
above, which automatically uses the results of the
analyses of the other groups.
Previously, we stated that several departments
within the MoI have an interest in gas utilization.
To facilitate discussion within the MoI, separate mod-
ules for the manufacturing bulk consumers (FERTI-
LIZER, BASIC CHEMICALS, CEMENT, and IRON
and STEEL), as well as a module for the rest of the
manufacturing sector (OTHER MANUFACTURING)
were included at Level 2. The results of the modules
for bulk consumers can thus be combined to facilitate
the decision process within the MoI. The support can
be augmented with OTHER MANUFACTURING, to
analyze the effect of all plans for the total manufactur-
ing sector. Each module results in the expected fuel
mix (the amount of coal, oil products, natural gas) for
the particular subsector or set of subsectors, given
energy prices and expected sector growth. So GASOP,
as every planning support should, coordinates the use
of information and the implementation of agreed upon
intermediary solutions for sub-problems. Furthermore,
the solutions of logically connected but larger sub-
problems (total manufacturing and power) can be
evaluated.
The total fuel mix is obtained by running the
module NATECON (Level 3). In SUPPLY and
DEMAND, the energy resources and energy demand
are confronted.This module isusedmainly toevaluate
the technical feasibility of demand scenarios, and the
effect new reserves will have on investment plans.
Only when the market matures will investments in
pipelines to tap reserves that are further away become
proﬁtable.
The module TRANSMISSION contains different
options for pipeline development. The total techni-
cally feasible transmission system has been split into
logically connected subsystems, which can be con-
sidered separately (for example, branch lines to parti-
culardemandcenters)orcanbepostponedtolaterdate
(for example, connections to gas reserves further
away). TRANSMISSION is used to develop and
analyze investment options for gas transmission given
the results of DEMAND and SUPPLY. For the pro-
posed transmission system, TRANSMISSION calcu-
lates the ﬁnancial and economic cost of planned
investments and their distribution over the planning
horizon. For the evaluation of the total proposed
energypolicy,COST/BENEFITisused; thiscombines
all ﬁnancial and economic information.
4.2. Implementation
The level of ITat the MoE at the time GASOP was
developed was low. There was no Intranet, only some
LANs within different departments. As a result,
GASOPwasbuildusingLotus123,witheverymodule
a separate (set) of spreadsheets. To use GASOP every
department involved in the formulation of energy
policy had to have a copy of the software. Maintaining
the ofﬁcial (agreed upon) version of the software was
the responsibility of the MoE-consultants. A depart-
ment or ministry and the consultants developed solu-
tions to sub-problems, but only after consultation and
decision makers at different levels could agree upon
the changes or assumptions to be introduced in the
ofﬁcial version of GASOP. Changes in the govern-
ment’s level of ITwere not required and only a limited
investment was needed in additional schooling. The
main problem was coordinating the activities of the
different groups supported by GASOP. Indeed, this is
where the project failed.
4.3. Decision support organization
To facilitate the correct use of the support GASOP
can give, regular and irregular meetings were orga-
nized. Every 3–6 months, representatives of the dif-
ferent departments (up to the director-generals of the
most important ministries) met to discuss proposed
solutions to sub-problems. During a meeting, pro-
posals were ranked and decisions (re)formulated.
After authorization, decisions were implemented in
the ofﬁcial version of GASOP, e.g. a decision not to
increase the amount of gas for Java’s major steel
factory and a nitrogen fertilizer plant in west Java.
Also, new sub-problems that had been identiﬁed were
discussed and possible strategies evaluated.
Representatives of all major stakeholders partici-
pated in the general meetings, which could last for
several days. Therewere also many irregular meetings
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on the problem at hand and the stage of a proposal.
A group would use GASOP (or the results obtained
with GASOP) to analyze a sub-problem and evaluate a
variety of proposals. One or more consultants were
always present at these meetings, which could be
withinadepartment,betweendepartments,orbetween
ministries, but also with representatives of the indus-
try.Inthisway,thepoliticalfeasibilityoftheproposals
was tested. A solution proposed by the ‘problem
owner’ was communicated to others to allow them
to evaluate the effect of this proposal on their own
analyzes. However, only in general meetings were
decisions put to the test, after this, all parties had to
accept the decision. Before this, a party could have
protested at a higher organizational level, but, given
the many prior discussions, this never happened.
5. Results
The results obtained with GASOP have had an
impact on the formulation of Java’s energy policy
and were used to resolvea number ofimportant issues,
but also raised several new ones.
GASOPwasusedtorankdemandcategories.Forthe
ﬁrst time, the Indonesian Government became aware
thatitwasnotproﬁtabletoserveallcustomers,andthat
energyintensiveones(nitrogenfertilizer,ironandsteel,
cement) should not be developed at the expense of the
rest of the manufacturing sector: they were neither
ﬁnancially nor economically viable. The Indonesian
CabinetdecidedtouseJava’sscarcegasreservesinhigh
value industrial applications (served mainly by PGN),
and in some forms of power generation.
The use of GASOP has, for the ﬁrst time, made the
Indonesian Government aware of the fact that Indo-
nesia’s commercial gas reserves are limited and that
the issue of gas export or domestic use needs further
consideration. Since Indonesia is the largest exporter
of LNG in the world, the Indonesian Government
assumed that there was sufﬁcient and affordable gas
available for the domestic market also. It was shown
that, due to the spatial distribution of Indonesia’s
gas reserves and the long-term export contracts, this
is not true.
It was also shown that the information on the gas
reservesin thevicinity of Java is unreliable and should
be updated before substantial investments are made.
As a result these reserves are under study. Several of
the investments to improve the current grid have been
realized over the past years. With new ﬁndings in
Sumatra, a connection between west Java (where most
industry is located) and south Sumatra has been found
tobeaneffectiveinvestment,theJapaneseGovernment
will supply a soft loan for this.
Also Indonesia’s gas law has been changed as a
result of support of the planning process. According to
the previous energy law, investments in gas transmis-
sioncouldonlybemadebyPERTAMINA.Historically,
this state-owned company’s main task was negotiating
with foreign oil companies and executing/monitoring
the export contracts signed by the Indonesian Govern-
ment. As a result of this focus, the emerging domestic
market was neglected. To foster the domestic market,
the government has allowed the gas distribution com-
pany PGN to invest in gas transmission pipelines to
supply its distribution networks.
GASOP has also helped to convince the Indonesian
Government to adjust its energy pricing policy; prices
were adjusted to be more in line with the economic
cost of the different fuels and the rates will be further
adjusted in the future. This issue was, however,
already high on the political agenda due to the efforts
of the World Bank and the IMF. GASOP has proven
to be a valuable tool for the asynchronous support of
the energy policy planning process. In this respect,
working with GASOP can be qualiﬁed as CSCW that
improved the quality of the decisions.
Did the use of GASOP speed up the decision
process? This is a question that cannot be answered,
sincethereisnoalternativeinformation.Thesystemin
combination with the policy formulation process has,
however, lead to a different view within many govern-
ment bodies on Indonesia’s domestic energy policy.
But others (industries, oil companies, etc.) have used
the results. New roads for policy planning have been
discovered.
5.1. Drawbacks
Is GASOP a success? Are there no drawbacks? As
always, there are. The proposed use in various min-
istries has never occurred. For three years the system
was used for policy evaluation and formulation, but
always with the help of consultants hired to support
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consultants left, only parts of GASOP were used, and
these not as originally intended. Only the MoE and the
gas distribution company PGN actually used (parts of)
GASOP. PGN for its marketing strategy, using the
detailed information on the value of gas in various
production processes.
Although a transfer of knowledge was conducted,
insufﬁcient attention was paid to this aspect. Also, the
organizational setting was problematic. During the
time the consultants were working on the problem,
there was support by the various ministries. After the
consultants left the MoE was mainly responsible for
GASOP. For the civil servants in other ministries, the
MoEisseen—atleasttosomeextent—asacompetitor
rather than as a co-worker. Insufﬁcient attention was
paid to deﬁne an adequate intra-ministerial organiza-
tional structure, with clear responsibilities and sufﬁ-
cient high level support. It was mistakenly assumed
that the clear advantages of the system, which were
sufﬁciently demonstrated, would be convincing
enough. Thus, the support by the consultants failed.
A better organizational setting would have made the
system more beneﬁcial.
That the concepts embodied in GASOP are con-
sidered valuable is, however, broadly recognized. In
1998, the ADB formulated a technical assistance
project, that is, donated money, for a revamp of the
original energy policy study and the related software
modelingconcept.Thescopehas,however,beendown-
sized. Hopefully, more attention will be paid to the
transfer of knowledge and the organizational setting.
6. Conclusions
Policy formulation for strategic issues is a difﬁcult,
time consuming and a never ending process, involving
manygovernment bodiesand otherstakeholders.Each
has its own goals, that often conﬂict with those of
others. To ‘solve’ this problem, the development of a
hierarchical GDSS to facilitate the long-term decision
process (how to choose) is more appropriate than
trying to formulate an oversimpliﬁed normativemodel
that allows the calculation of an ‘optimal’ solution
(what to choose). Such a GDSS can be looked upon as
a prescriptive model (to improve the decision making
process), not as a model that results in ‘the’ decision.
The aim of this paper was to give an impression
of how policy planning can be divided into sub-
problems, how these sub-problems are connected,
and how the decision making process in a developing
country can be supported without expensive invest-
ments in ITand human resources. The modular struc-
ture of GASOP allowed the different groups to
concentrate on their own sub-problems, coordinating
at the same time, the solutions for particular sub-
problems so far and making sure that everyone used
the correct inputs.
By connecting solutions for sub-problems and eval-
uating their effect, an energy policy for Java was
obtained that was better communicated, and therefore,
better understood. It was through bargaining between
the ‘owners’ of the different sub-problems that this
satisﬁcing policy formulation was reached. Through
this process, a clear picture of all issues emerged. It
allowed the Indonesian Government to improve the
quality of its decisions on energy-related problems
and domestic gas utilization. The GDSS GASOP was
instrumental in revealing a number of policy issues,
that had been neglected or had not been identiﬁed.
These issues are now on the political agenda, policy
planning is a continuous and time consuming process
demanding an adequate organizational setting.
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